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Introduction
Three hundred years ago the Enlightenment promoted an optimistic
faith in the future and a fundamental belief in the power of reason. It
was believed that reason, defined as the "objective" power of the
mind, would uncover the universal principles that govern the world.
Reason would free humankind from ignorance and superstition.1 Ap-
plied to human events, reason would uncover the universal character of
human history.2
Almost from the beginning, the stress on reason sparked currents
of discontent and uneasiness. A romantic movement emerged to chal-
lenge the primacy of "rationality" in the Enlightenment view of hu-
man nature. The romantics expressed the fear that a "rational-scien-
tific" ontology negated the emotional character of life. For this group a
purely rational existence negated life itself.
This article explores the ways in which this tension between ra-
tionalism and romanticism influenced the character of Max Weber's
work. Along with Georg Jellinek, Alfred Weber, Ernst Troeltsch,
Wilhelm Windelband and others who were part of Heidelberg's
"Eranos" circle, Weber was interested in developing a framework for
comparative analysis of social phenomena. This group, who along with
Heinrich Rickert constituted the core of the southwestern Germany
Neo-Kantian movement, had Weber as its methodologist. Weber had to
1 Immanual Kant, "What Is Enlightenment," in Carl Friedrich, ed., The Philosophy
of Kant (New York: Random House, 1949), 132-39.
2 Immanual Kant, "Idea for a Universal History with Cosmopolitan Intent," in
ibid., 116-31.
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confront the issue of how "rational" and "scientific" the study of so-
cial phenomena could be. It is Weber, therefore, who had to confront
the demands of Kant's rationalism and reconcile those demands with
the strongly romantic context that was part of the Heidelberg environ-
ment.
The writings of Weber are marked by a tension between the re-
quirements of Kantian rationalism and the demands of Weber's per-
sonal value commitments. (Weber referred to these as "substantive val-
ues.") When systematically examined it is clear that both of these ele-
ments are inseparably linked, and that the "rationalist" elements of
Weber's methodology serve the substantive ends of Weber's value
commitments. In that sense my argument will be similar to those of
Lawrence Scaff, Reinhard Bendix, Wolfgang Mommsen and numerous
others.3 Weber's often quoted criticisms of capitalism and bureaucracy
are but two manifestations of his more general criticism of modern ra-
tional culture, reflecting the conflict between his commitment to both
modern rationalist epistemology and a romantic ontology.
This ontological commitment caused many of Max Weber's
friends and associates to describe him as a romantic. However, and
contrary to the works of Eden, Mommsen and Warren,4 I will argue
that it is a mistake to assume that Weber's romantic roots lie with Nie-
tzsche. As Warren and Eden admit, some elements of Weber's romanti-
cism are not altogether consistent with Nietzsche. Specifically, unlike
that of Nietzsche, Weber's criticism did not take the form of a confron-
tation with the foundations of Enlightenment epistemology. In that
sense, Weber's romanticism is thoroughly "modern."
This article asserts that Weber's romanticism is closer to that con-
veyed in the writings of the "Sturm und Drang." The "Sturm und
Drang," unlike Nietzsche, did not confront the underpinnings of the
Enlightenment, but rather criticized the stress on "reason" in the Kant-
ian ontology. Weber further refined the general claim of the "Sturm
und Drang" by distinguishing different types of "reason" in order to
argue that substantive claims can also represent a form of reason. This
methodological strategy allowed Weber to defend the concerns about
modern society and its effect on the "complete" individual while re-
maining generally within the Kantian epistemological framework.
3 Lawrence A. Scaff, "Fleeing the Iron Cage: Politics and Culture in the Thought of
Max Weber," American Political Science Review 81 (1987), 737-55; Reinhard
Bendix, Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait (New York: Doubleday, 1965); and
Wolfgang Mommsen, "Max Weber's Political Sociology and His Philosophy of
World History," International Social Science Journal 17 (1965), 23-45.
4 Robert Eden, "Bad Conscience for a Nietzscheian Age," Review of Politics 45
(1983), 366-92; Mommsen, "Max Weber's Political Sociology"; and Mark War-
ren, "Max Weber's Liberalism for a Nietzschean World," American Political
Science Review 82 (1988), 31-50.
Abstract. Max Weber's writings convey a tension between a commitment to Enlight-
enment rationalism and a romanticism that was largely shaped under the influence of
the "Sturm und Drang." The tension is represented in the claims that modernity un-
leashes forces that erode the spontaneous, creative elements of human life. This study
argues that Weber has correctly identified some of the problematic substance of mod-
ernism, but that he failed to explore alternative sets of assumptions by which the mod-
ernist paradigm could be critiqued. As a result, Weber was forced to see the world as a
place full of bifurcated conflicts between such elements as: reason/emotion, mod-
ern/traditional, science/mysticism. This epistemological framework led Weber to the
pessimistic conclusions about the fate of humanity in the modern world.
Resume. Les Merits de Max Weber communiquent une tension entre un engagement
envers le rationalisme du Siecle des Lumieres et un romantisme qui se forma en grande
partie sous l'influence de « Sturm und Drang ». La tension est represented dans les re-
vendications que la modernity dechaine les forces qui Srodent les e'le'ments crgateurs
spontane's de la vie humaine. Cette Stude argumente que Weber a identify quelques-
unes des substances problgmatiques du modernisme, mais qu'il a omis d'explorer des
ensembles alternatifs d'hypotheses par lesquels le paradigme du moderniste pourrait
etre critique". II en re"sulte que Weber fut oblige" de voir le monde comme une place
pleine de conflits bifurques entre des e'le'ments tels que: raison/e'motion, modernity/tra-
dition, science/mysticisme. Ce cadre e'piste'mologique a amene' Weber aux conclusions
pessimistes sur le sort de l'humanite' dans le monde moderne.
The analysis concludes by arguing that Weber's pessimism about
the fate of the individual in modern society results from his adherence
to the "modernist" conception of knowledge. The Enlightenment view
of knowledge stresses the tension between objective reason and human
emotions. By maintaining this essential opposition Weber is drawn to
the only conclusion possible. Emotion, passion and creativity are sup-
planted when rationality influences an ever greater sphere of human ac-
tivity.
Weber did not fully accept the priority of "rationalism" in human
life, but at the same time he was not willing to give up the modernist
paradigm of rational science. He sought a synthesis that would explain
both the rational process of human understanding and the emotional
commitments that he defined as essential components of the human
personality. However, by maintaining the modernist position, that
science produces "objective" knowledge, while social inquiry pro-
duces only "interpretive understanding," Weber's synthesis suggests
the priority of "rational science" over social interpretation. Weber is
forced to conclude that the superior power of science is generated from
its ability to turn human subjects into objects of study and manipula-
tion. Thus, this understanding of knowledge produces an irreconcilable
tension between science and human values. By making these assump-
tions, Weber was forced to conclude that tension, anomie and dehu-
manization are the result of modernity and the march of "objective"
reason.
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1. The Origins of Synthesis
A. The Romantic Influence: The "Sturm und Drang"
The environment in southern Germany at the turn of the twentieth cen-
tury had a strong undercurrent of romanticism. In Munich there was the
"Kosmische Runde" (cosmic circle), a group that opposed the ration-
alism of Kant in favor of "instinct" and "intuition." In Heidelberg
there was the Stephan George Circle, whose members sought an aes-
thetic rather than scientific understanding of the world. Also in Heidel-
berg was Weber's circle, a group dominated by the personality of Max
Weber and his concerns for the fate of the individual in the modern, in-
dustrial, bureaucratic society.
These groups shared a romantic heritage from a seventeenth-cen-
tury movement known as the "Sturm und Drang." The "Sturm und
Drang" included Johann Merek (1741-1803), Johann von Herder
(1749-1803), Johann von Goethe (1749-1832), Friedrich von Klinger
(1752-1831) and several less famous authors. Friedrich Schiller
(1759-1805) is also sometimes included in this group. These authors
stressed the importance of the individual as the creator of life and cul-
ture. If the essence of mankind is creativity, then the human quest is for
free, creative expression. Anything that inhibits that expression is an
affront to human essence.
The "Sturm und Drang" reacted against a mechanical world view
that had emerged from the Enlightenment. They argued that the natural
harmony and unity of the earlier enlightenment (specifically Classical
Greece) was disrupted by the fragmentation of human faculties, the
division of labour and the separation of humans from nature. Since
Descartes, reason was treated as a faculty separate and distinct from
emotion. And, what was worse, reason was set against emotion in the
rationalist ontology. This is particularly true in Kantian rationalism,
where reason has the role of controlling the spontaneous and impulsive
side of life.
As Schiller put it, the Kantian system is technical and devoid of
feeling.5 It fails to understand the balance and "harmony" that must
exist between "feeling" and "reason." There are two instincts that
drive human beings: the formal and the sensual.6 The formal is that side
of the human character that seeks the universal and unchangeable
ideals in nature. It is that part of ourselves that can transcend what is
immediate and sensual. The sensual connects one to material existence.
The cultivation of both sides of the human character is necessary in or-
der to maintain a truly human existence.
5 Friedrich Schiller, Complete Works, vol. 8 (New York: Collier and Sons, 1902), 34.
6 Ibid., 68-69.
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While expressing the need for ontological unity, the "Sturm und
Drang" argued that the requirements for intense personal experience
remained incompatible with the social demand for order and conformity.
The individual, defined in this manner, cannot avoid conflict with social
institutions. Johann Herder stated that society degrades the individual.7
To live a life that is truly creative and spontaneous is to live outside of the
conformity and stagnation of society. The sentiments conveyed by
Herder clearly expressed the view of the "Sturm und Drang" on the dif-
ficulty faced by the individual confronting modern rational culture.
The political and social ideas of the "Sturm und Drang" were
clearly opposed to the historical tendency of their time. Small commu-
nities were presented as an ideal at the very time the modern nation-
state system was emerging. On the eve of the industrial revolution
Herder warned against the uniformity and obedience that results from
"living life like a cog" in a bureaucratic machine.8 Weber made the
same claim at the end of both The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of
Capitalism and Economy and Society.9
The contrast between the "Sturm und Drang" and the rationalist
ontology was clearly not lost on Weber. In defining his own task as a
sociologist Weber once described his fate as "seeing what he could en-
dure" given his understanding of the world. To Weber, the world was
moving toward "mechanized petrification,"10 rule by administrators
rather than "complete" individuals,11 and control by the "rational"
"organic" "machine" known as bureaucracy.12 In this essentially
"modern" condition, individual worth was lost. The individual was
turned into a "cog" in the social mechanism.13
B. The Influence of Kantian Rationalism
Weber's romantic vision of modern life is combined with an epistemol-
ogy that is essentially Kantian. As Weber stated so emphatically, "the
fundamental ideas of modern epistemology . . . ultimately derive from
Kant."14 Along with Heinrich Rickert, Wilhelm Windelband, Georg
7 Roy Pascal, The German Sturm und Drang (Manchester: Manchester University
Press, 1953), 226.
8 Ibid., 190-91.
9 Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (New York:
Scribner, 1958), 181-83, and Economy and Society (Berkeley: University of Cali-
fornia, 1978), 1402-03.
10 Weber, Protestant Ethic, 182.
11 Max Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, ed. by E. Shils and J. Finch
(New York: Free Press, 1946), 95.
12 Weber, Economy and Society, 1402.
13 Weber, From Max Weber, 228.
14 Max Weber, The Methodology of the Social Sciences, trans, and ed. by E. Shils and
H. Finch (New York: Free Press, 1949), 106.
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Jellinek and several others, Weber was a part of the Neo-Kantian tradi-
tion at the end of the nineteenth century.
Kantian epistemology asserts a distinction between the senses and
the intellect. The senses put the subject "in touch" with the world of
object, and it is the intellect that "represents" those impressions as ob-
jects of thought.15 There remains, however, a distinction between the
objects as they are "in themselves" and the representations that are
formed by the human intellect. "What objects may be in themselves,
and apart from this receptivity of our sensibilities, remains completely
unknown to us."16 We never have complete knowledge of objects; we
only know the impressions they leave on our sensory apparatus.
The intellect is not, as suggested by the empiricists, a blank slate.
Kant posits an intellect that contains "faculties" to process the infor-
mation that comes from the senses. Kant called these faculties
"categories." Human beings sense what is "there," but only accord-
ing to those modes of perception and categories of thought which are
present in the human intellect.17 To Kant, there is an interaction be-
tween the senses and the faculties for understanding. This interaction
produces the representation of experience called "knowledge." But
this "knowledge" is limited to the world of objects, what Kant called
the phenomenal world.
Science is the study of those objects. Science has as its goal the
uncovering of the principles that govern the regularity of occurrences
among objects. Science gives us knowledge because "reason" allows
us to create "synthetic" statements about the objects of experience. (A
synthetic statement is one that provides "observational" information
about an object.18) Scientific "principles" reflect the laws that govern
the interaction of objects in the phenomenal world. To Kant, such prin-
ciples have the status of a priori statements; a statement that is outside
of and not dependent upon experience. Scientific principles have the
status of a "synthetic a priori." Therefore, such statements give knowl-
edge but are not dependent on immediate sensual verification. In fact,
Kant claimed that in order for the knowledge represented by a scientific
principle to be "pure" it must not be affected by or dependent upon
"sensation."
However, Kant was not only interested in the principles of
science. Kant was also concerned with the foundation of human moral-
ity and values. But there is a problem. Ethical systems, moral commit-
ments and personal values have their foundations in metaphysics, not
15 Kant, The Philosophy of Kant, 39.
16 Ibid., 54.
17 Immanual Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason, trans, by Norman Kemp Smith
(New York: Random House, 1958), 54.
18 Kant, The Philosophy of Kant, 30.
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science. For Kant, this means that statements about morality cannot
produce the same quality of statement produced in the study of the phe-
nomenal world. Metaphysics cannot produce "synthetic a priori" state-
ments.19 As a result, ethical systems are not grounded in "knowledge"
but in an assumption. That assumption is the "freedom of the will."
Coupled with the assertion that ethics and morality cannot be "de-
duced" from actual practice, Kant's position suggests that there can be
no "knowledge" of values, as there is "knowledge" of the principles
that govern the phenomenal world.
Kant's claim is very important for Weber. In constructing a meth-
odology for "social science" Weber was forced to confront the roles
pjayed by morality and value commitments. He concluded that human
beings cannot conduct "social science" with the same methodological
"purjty" that one finds in the natural sciences. The study of society re-
quires the assignment of "meaning" and "significance." As Weber
put it, the investigator chooses the object for investigation out of an in-
finitely complex stream of events by reflecting upon his or her own val-
ues. A "point of view" is also essential in the formulation of the con-
cepts to be used in conducting the investigation. At every stage in an
investigation the values of the investigator are going to shape the con-
duct and the outcome of an inquiry. There is no such thing as simple,
objective, descriptive analysis.20
"Social science" is limited to an "interpretive understanding"
because it lacks the concrete foundational premises upon which objec-
tive analysis can be conducted. To use Kant's terminology, because in-
quiry into human beings is dependent upon metaphysical assumptions
rather than synthetic a priori judgements, the quality of the statements
in the "social sciences" must remain speculative. "Social science" is,
therefore, qualitatively different from the natural sciences.
However, while accepting the basic parameters of Kantian epis-
temology, Weber was less convinced by Kant's optimism regarding
modernity and the rational culture. Kant stressed the role of reason in
human progress. The externalization of reason in the legal and political
realm would protect the individual from the irrational, impulsive side
of human nature. Rationality is, therefore, a positive force for change in
society. In what is little more than a logical extension of his optimistic
appraisal of rationality, Kant suggested that human history is revealing
a teleology: the movement of humanity toward an ever more perfect
constitution of social life.21 Weber believed none of this. Weber was
quite pessimistic about the conditions of modernity. Western civiliza-
tion had undergone technical development, but to Weber this in no way
19 Ibid., 35.
20 Weber, The Methodology, 84, 94.
21 Kant, The Philosophy of Kant, 448-49.
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implied a corresponding "moral progress." The externalization of rea-
son, what Weber called the "mind objectified," can produce negative
consequences in the social realm. The residue of rationalization, indus-
trial production and bureaucratic organization depletes the individual of
the spontaneous, creative character of human existence. Institutional
life is rigid. Rigidity reproduces itself in the process of social reproduc-
tion. Modernity comes to represent conformity and petrified existence.
The complete individual, as Goethe suggested, is something left to a
bygone era.
On this question Weber aligned himself with the romantics. He gave
a comprehensive explanation of the way in which the "complete" indi-
vidual is displaced in modern culture. In a diverse set of writings on capi-
talism, bureaucracy, religion and history, Weber defended the worth of
the individual against the petrification of institutional life. To carry out
his analysis, however, Weber required a set of conceptual tools.
2. Creating "Interpretation" in Weber's Analysis of Culture
A. Values and ' 'Interpretive Sociology''
Weber was interested in explaining the relationships among various
ideas, historical events and social phenomena. To this end, Weber ar-
gued for an "interpretive" understanding of social phenomenon. By
"interpretation" Weber meant that all social events require some intel-
lectual context, values, norms and structures against which occurrences
could be compared. And, said Weber, the analysis of social phenomena,
history and culture always involved the assignment of human values.
Values cannot be separated from the process of cultural analysis.
"Culture" is a value concept; "Culture is a finite segment of the mean-
ingless infinity of the world process, a segment on which 'human be-
ings' confer meaning and significance."22 The meaning given to cul-
ture is a reflection of the values of the investigator and his or her age.
"Empirical reality becomes 'culture' to us because and insofar as we
relate it to value ideas."23 "The transcendental presupposition of every
cultural science lies not in our finding a certain culture or 'culture' in
general to be valuable but rather in the fact that we are 'cultural be-
ings,' endowed with the capacity and the will to take a deliberate atti-
tude towards the world and to lend it significance." However, added,
Weber, our values may lead us to the conclusion that any empirical cul-
tural creation is a "mortal enemy" of our evaluative ideals.24
22 Weber, The Methodology, 76, 81.
23 Ibid., 76.
24 Ibid., 81.
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B. Affinity, Tension and the Problem of Causality
In order to conduct his romantic critique of modern culture, Weber
created a methodological strategy that would allow him both to stay
within the general Kantian epistemological framework and to criticize
the emerging social tendencies. But Weber had to confront a problem.
Weber believed an exhaustive causal explanation of any event was im-
possible. To speak of "causality" in more than a limited sense was,
therefore, highly suspect. Weber concluded that there was a concept
that could explain how two phenomena can have reciprocal influence
on one another without, necessarily, representing linear causality. Inter-
estingly, such an idea can be found in the work of the "Sturm und
Drang."
In a novel entitled Elective Affinities, Goethe defined a method for
understanding social life in his explanation of the different characteris-
tics of men and women. He described women as having an understand-
ing of "how things hang together in life." Women understand the "in-
terdependence" of concrete events, ideas and the relationship of the
past to the present.25 In Goethe's novel the female characters examined
the "interconnectedness" of their lives with those of others with whom
they come in contact. Weber was to use this notion of interconnected-
ness in his study of social phenomena. "Elective affinities" became a
central feature of Weber's methodology. Weber used the term "affin-
ity" to describe a condition of symbiosis, or mutual support, among
two or more ideas, practices or institutions. It represented a soft alterna-
tive to the "hard facts" of natural scientific causality. For example, an
affinity exists between the substantive components of Calvinist belief
and the instrumental calculation of capitalism.26 The term "affinity"
conveys the mutually reinforcing nature of these two practices.
Phenomena that are not mutually supporting may either have a
neutral relation to one another, or they may exist in logical opposition
to one another. This antagonistic relationship is most often described
by the terms "tension" or "conflict." Tensions, as logical contradic-
tions and conflicts, also exist among institutions, ideas, or practices.
For example, the concept of "brotherliness" is in conflict with the de-
mands of instrumental calculation found in the capitalist economic sys-
tem. Art and eroticism, in their "this worldly" orientation are in con-
flict with the "otherworldliness" of religion.27 There are, of course, nu-
merous examples in Weber's writings of how social life reflects an ar-
ray of affinities and tensions.
25 Johann von Goethe, Elective Affinities (New York: Holt and Williams Publishing,
1872), 5-6.
26 Weber, The Protestant Ethic.
27 Weber, From Max Weber, 331, 342-45.
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The idea of support or conflict among ideas and institutions re-
placed "causality" in much of Weber's work. Weber saw no purpose
in trying to reduce history to a monocausal teleology. He was very crit-
ical of Marx's methodology on this account.28 Weber argued that his-
tory was the interplay of an infinite variety of forces, each exercising
some small influence on shaping culture into what it " is ." Sometimes
even small events could be significant in shaping historical outcomes.29
The affinities and tensions among the various social forces convey the
subtlety and the richness of cultural development and provide a method
to explain the course of history in Western society. The goal of social
inquiry was to explain the "uniqueness" of an existing social condi-
tion, not to reduce it to a generality.30
Weber used the concepts of "affinities" and "tensions" to ex-
plain cultural development without resorting to a linear notion of cau-
sality. Adopting this idea from Goethe, along with the concept of the
"ideal type" from Herder,31 Weber augmented the Kantian epistemol-
ogy. Historical and cultural analysis need not seek to produce reduc-
tionist causal "laws." The investigator can create concepts and typolo-
gies that can then be shown to exist in complex interrelationship to one
another. The concepts of "affinities" and "tensions" allow this
method to function.
3. Rationality and the Institutions of Modern Culture
A. The Typology of Rationality
Weber created the framework for his romantic critique of modern insti-
tutions through the fabrication of a fourfold typology of rationality.
After defining the various usages of the term "rationality" in the ab-
stract, Weber showed the ways in which the four types of rationality
were represented in social life. To Weber, the implications of "ration-
ality" had many facets. Rationality had been the foundation for an im-
proved understanding of the environment. It had assisted in the produc-
tion for human needs. However, the march of "rational culture" was
diminishing the worth of the individual and eroding the prospects for
social development. These rather diverse consequences rely on the dif-
ferent meanings Weber applied to the use of the term "rationality."
The clearest elaboration of the multiple ways that Weber used the
term "rationality" is found in The Social Psychology of the World Re-
28 Weber, The Methodology, 68-71.
29 Max Weber, Roscher and Knies: The Logical Problems of Historical Economics
(New York: Free Press, 1975), 103.
30 Weber, The Methodology, 80.
31 Otto Stammer et al., Max Weber and Sociology Today (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1971), 217.
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ligions. Here Weber suggested that the term "rationality" could be as-
signed a variety of meanings. "We have to remind ourselves in ad-
vance that 'rationalism' may mean very different things." It may mean
"an increasing mastery of reality by means of increasingly precise and
abstract concepts." It has another meaning as the "attainment of a defi-
nitely given and practical end by means of an increasingly precise cal-
culation of adequate means." Rationality "may also mean a systematic
arrangement." This involves the creation of "forms" and the adher-
ence to "practices" in one's life. Finally, the term rationality "may be
applied to that process which distinguishes between valid norms and
that which is empirically given." This form of rationality is expressed
as the belief in a canon, or a view of life, which is then applied to one's
experience. Examples of this form of rationality are found in the ethics
of religious practice, or in the Renaissance commitment to a supreme
artistic ideal.32 For convenience, these types of rationality will be re-
ferred to as "conceptual," "instrumental," "formal" and "substan-
tive," respectively.
There has been some debate as to whether or not Weber conceived
these forms of rationality in any type of a hierarchy. Joachim Israel ar-
gues that Weber's praise of the efficiency of modern bureaucracy and
capitalism would indicate his preference for formal order and organiza-
tion.33 Donald Levine suggests that because science cannot confirm the
validity of value judgments within Weber's epistemology, the individ-
ual is therefore released from considerations of an ultimate value posi-
tion.34 Stephen Kalberg suggests that for Weber substantive rationality,
the ordering of the world according to one's ethical commitments, pro-
vided the essence of personality in the individual.35 This view is echoed
by Ed Portis and by Wolfgang Mommsen.36
Looking at Weber's work as a whole, and particularly his attacks
on bureaucracy and all other social forms that threaten the worth of the
individual, it is clear that Weber used his own substantive commitments
to organize his critique. Weber's attack on bureaucracy at the end of
Economy and Society leaves little doubt that "formalism" was per-
ceived by Weber as a threat to humanity. It is also clear, contrary to
Donald Levine, that Weber's understanding of the role of values in so-
32 Weber, From Max Weber, 293.
33 Joachim Israel, Alienation: From Marx to Modern Sociology (Boston: Allyn and
Bacon, 1971), 120-21.
34 Donald Levine, "Rationality and Freedom: Weber and Beyond," Sociological In-
quiry 51 (1981), 19.
35 Stephen Kalberg, "Max Weber's Types of Rationality: Cornerstones for the Anal-
ysis of Rationalization Process in History," American Journal of Sociology 85
(1980), 1165.
36 Ed Portis, "Max Weber's Theory of Personality," Sociological Inquiry 48 (1978),
113; and Mommsen, "Max Weber's Political Sociology."
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cial science would never suggest that value commitments are not ra-
tional. History and culture have no meaning without values. Substan-
tive rationality unifies and gives meaning to the entire personality. It is
precisely this essence of the personality which, to Weber, was being
eroded in modern culture.
Weber used his typology of rationality, the concepts of "affini-
ties" and "tensions," and the romantic individualism of his own sub-
stantive value system in order to create a critique of modern rational
culture. While accepting the methodology of the Kantian epistemology,
Weber rejected the optimistic faith in reason, progress and universal
culture. In place of those values Weber asserted a set of values closer to
the romantic tradition of the "Sturm und Drang."
B. The Tension Between the Individual and the
Requirements of Institutional Life
Weber saw modern life as an interplay of the various types of ration-
ality as they became manifest in particular institutional forms. All so-
cial life was characterized by the formation and adherence to institu-
tions. Institutions were, for Weber, defined as patterns of behaviour car-
ried out by human individuals. Collective concepts such as "state"
were simply the concepts used to describe the patterns of individual
behaviour within a large social context; only individuals were capable
of performing subjectively meaningful behaviour.37 As patterns of
behaviour, institutions were external, empirical arrangements in social
life. They reflected the rationality innate in the human being manifested
as external norms and procedures.
However, Weber's typology of rationality is not unidimensional. It
has four facets. In carrying out the analysis of existing society Weber
showed how the different facets of rationality were represented in the
various institutions of modern culture. He used these concepts in order
to characterize modernity and to demonstrate the mechanism by which
modern culture was in conflict with the "individual."
To Weber, the institutions of modern culture contained all the ele-
ments of rationality: instrumental, formal, conceptual and substantive.
Each may, however, have a different emphasis. Capitalism represents
the means-ends calculation of instrumental reason. Bureaucracy reflects
the organized pattern of behaviour found in formal rationality. Both
science and religious prophecy reorder man's relationship with the nat-
ural order, as conceptual rationality. Religious doctrines and ethical
systems contain the norms representative of substantive rationality.
Capitalism, religious institutions and state bureaucracies all have some
structural characteristics representative of formal rationality.
37 Weber, Economy and Society, 13,14.
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In studying these institutions of modern life, Weber sought to
show how the various institutions of modern society are a reflection of
human reason. However, Weber also wanted to convey something
more. Through the linkage of institutions to specific facets of the hu-
man personality Weber was able to convey the process whereby institu-
tional development affects the character of "being," in an ontological
sense, for the individual. Society is constantly in transition. Weber was
disturbed by the logical implications of the trends he saw emerging as
he conducted his analysis of these modern embodiments of rationality.
C. Capitalism and Instrumental Reason
Capitalism, in Weber's work, is not characterized by a stronger eco-
nomic interest, but by its rational organization. Capitalism is present
where the procedure of capital accounting is present.38 Rational ac-
counting is, in its essence, instrumental calculation, "economic plan-
ning," in which the goal of profit maximization is carried out.39 As a
network of interrelated factors, capitalism also represents a set of for-
mal and substantive components. Reflecting formal rationality, capital-
ism has formal legal structures that make its predictability possible.40
Some of capitalism's substantive features include a free labour force,
freedom of contract and free markets.41 However, despite the affinity of
capitalism with certain formal structures and substantive ideals, capital-
ism remains essentially instrumental in nature.
In its instrumental character, capitalism is also in conflict or ten-
sion with other elements found in contemporary culture. It focusses on
commodities and profits, not people.42 In that regard capitalism is in
conflict with one of the substantive tenets of religion, "brotherli-
ness."43 In fact, capitalism is "indifferent" to the overarching claims
of all substantive values. For this reason, Weber claimed that capital-
ism, itself, is substantively "irrational."44
At this point the logical implications of the forms of rationality
found in contemporary society give way to a romantic critique of in-
strumental culture. Weber repeatedly used the term "machine" when
referring to the instrumental organization of society for the purpose of
profitability.45 The "machine" was contrasted with the concept of "in-
38 Max Weber, General Economic History (Glencoe, 111.: Free Press, 1950), 275,355-56.
39 Weber, Economy and Society, 63.
40 Ibid., 75, 161-62.
41 Ibid., 108.
42 Ibid., 631.
43 Weber, From Max Weber, 331.
44 Weber, Economy and Society, 94,138.
45 Max Weber, Max Weber: Selections in Translation, ed. by W. G. Runciman (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 101; Weber, Economy and Society,
1156; and Weber, Protestant Ethic, 181.
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dividuality." The individual is a creature defined by values. The indi-
vidual takes a stand toward the world.46 However, instrumental reason
diminishes our ability to orient our behaviour to substantive values,
thus diminishing the importance of the individual personality.
Capitalism represents an economic system based ori competition
and struggle.47 However, unlike Marx, Weber did not oppose capitalism
because it caused the "struggle of man against man." "Struggle" was
natural to the human condition. Through struggle great individuals
emerged.48 Therefore, the idea of "struggle" was not the problerh
Weber had with capitalism.
Kant, Nietzsche and the "Sturm und Drang" all shared the idea
that there is an historical dynamic that emerges from struggle. But
Weber did not share the optimism about the rationalization of culture
that was part of the Kantian legacy, nor did he argue, as did Nietzsche,
that the culture could find a solution through the radical reordering of
the Enlightenment itself. Weber's conclusions were more pessimistic
about the fate of the human being in a ratiofializing culture. On this
point Weber was clearly closer to the perspective of the "Sturm und
Drang."
D. Bureaucracy and Formal Rationality
Weber defined "bureaucracy" as a "rationally regulated associai*
tion."49 It represents formal patterns of behaviour, rules of conduct and
organized procedures. Bureaucracy is an external rational construct
formed to organize information and activity. Due to its ability to orgarf-
ize and use information, bureaucracy is "the most rationally known
means of exercising authority over human beings." Activity within a
bureaucracy conforms to rules, those organized and written procedures
that give the bureaucracy its form. Bureaucracy is that aspect of ration-
ality that makes a "systematic ordering of reality." It is, therefore, rep-
resentative of formal rationality. In practice this systematic ordering of
reality has penetrated every aspect of human association. It is found in
the state, the army, economic enterprises, political parties, the church
and many other areas of modern life.50 It was for Weber the defining
characteristic of contemporary social organizations.
Bureaucracy has a strong affinity with the features of modern in-
dustrial capitalism. The bureaucratic form of organization is the most
efficient way of organizing an economic enterprise. As Weber sug-
46 Weber, From Max Weber, 127.
47 Weber, Economy and Society, 108.
48 Max Weber, Gesammelte Politische Schriften (Munchen: Drei Masken Verlag,
1921), 18, 20.
49 Weber, Economy and Society, 954.
50 Ibid., 223, 956.
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gested, the development of both the bureaucratic state and modern cap-
italism have been mutually supportive. Capitalism depends on the for-
mally rational structures found in the state for predictability in opera-
tion. The bureaucratic state is enhanced by capitalism's need for pre-
dictable calculation. Thus capitalism and bureaucracy promote the cen-
tralization of all coercive power in one institution, the state.51 The for-
mal institutionalization of power within the state enhances the formali-
zation of law. However, the tendency toward bureaucratic formalism in
the law collides with the substantive notion of "justice."52 There is, in
the filial analysis, no guarantee that bureaucracy serves either justice or
democracy.53
Despite bureaucracy's affinity with certain formal requirements of
instrumental capitalism and its "efficiency" as a method of social or-
ganization, Weber was very critical of bureaucracy's influence on the
individual. This was due to the tension that characterizes the relation-
. ship between formal and substantive types of rationality. Weber con-
veyed this tension in a discussion of the types of individuals present in
rhodfcrri society.
The expansion of bureaucracy requires ever more specialists. The
"specialist" is oriented to a task. The specialist is "chained to his ac-
tivity by his entire material and ideal existence." He is a single "cog"
in an ever-moving human mechanism that is prescribed a fixed routine.
But the,"cog" is not a complete human being. He is a "specialist with-
out spirit." the bureaucrat follows orders and does not act according to
individual substantive values. Bureaucracy engages "experts" with
"specialized knowledge!" In modern society these experts are in con-
flict with the "older type,of cultivated man."54 The "cultivated man"
is a person whose "bearing in life" is nurtured and developed. The
"cultivated man" is a complete individual, one whose life is oriented
and directed by substantive values. The message of Goethe's Wilhelm
Meister is clear. The complete individual, the "cultivated man," re-
treats before modern "rational culture."
To judge ourselves, said Weber, we must look at the self-reinforc-
ing nature of the bureaucratic order.
[£]very type of social order, without exception, must, if one wishes to evaluate
it, be explained with reference to the opportunities which it affords to certain
types of persons to rise to positions of superiority through the operation of the
various objective and subjective selective factors.55
• 51 Ibid., 225, 337.
52 Weber, From Max Weber, 221 v
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Modern society gives the advantage to the bureaucratic mentality. This
results from the reinforcing nature of rational culture as it pervades
every aspect of human existence. Individuals adjust themselves to ex-
ternal reality.56 The externalization of order, as bureaucratic formalism,
changes the social environment. The individual is transformed by con-
tact with an environment in which bureaucracy has become the domi-
nant form of organization.
By altering social conditions bureaucracy is replicating itself in
the psyche of individuals. The individual internalizes the operative
norms in the environment. In modern culture, the norms of rational for-
malism are a disfigured substitute for human values. Specifically, the
internalization of the substantive aspects of formalism, "order" as a
substantive value, reinforces a culture of domination. The individual of
"culture" increasingly confronts formal culture as something alien and
hostile to its own ontological completeness.
4. Modernity, Anomie and Social Transformation
A. Disenchantment and Conceptual Rationality
In order to complete the picture of how Weber used the typology of ra-
tionality to critique modern culture it is necessary to examine the idea
of "disenchantment" and to show the impact of this idea on the indi-
vidual and historic change. "Disenchantment" is a term borrowed
from Friedrich Schiller.57 Weber used it to convey the general impact of
rationalization on the individual and society. "Disenchantment" indicated
that the world was undergoing "demythification" as rational science re-
placed magic as the means of understanding the empirical world.
In all times there has been but one means to breaking down the power of
magic and establishing a rational conduct of life: this means is great rational
prophecy. Not every prophecy by any means destroys the power of magic: but
it is possible for a prophet who furnishes credentials in the sphere of miracles
and otherwise, to break down the traditional sacred rules. Prophecies have re-
leased the world from magic and in doing so have created the basis for our
modern science and technology, and for capitalism.58
Weber used the word "prophecy" in a general sense to describe a
process by which an individual introduces a new conceptual ordering
of the world. In religion this may take the form of the introduction of a
new transcendental aesthetic. But here Weber did not talk of "proph-
ecy" in a strictly religious sense. "Prophecy" referred to a new con-
56 Weber, Selections, 232.
57 Weber, From Max Weber, Introduction, 51.
58 Weber, General Economic History, 265.
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ceptual orientation to the world. "Rational prophecy" is that concep-
tual reorientation that occurs as sciences replaces magic as the basis for
explanation of natural phenomena. Disenchantment is, therefore, a re-
sult of what Weber termed conceptual or theoretical rationality.
By reducing the influence of magical explanations in the world,
rational prophecy removed religion from ever increasing facets of hu-
man life. Religion was pushed into the domain of the irrational. Thus
there is tremendous "tension" between religious orientation and the ra-
tional orientation given by mathematics and science.59 This is the case
because "science encounters the claims of the ethical postulate that the
world is a God-ordained, and hence somehow a meaningful and ethi-
cally oriented, cosmos. In principle, the empirical as well as the mathe-
matically oriented view of the world develops refutations of every in-
tellectual approach which in any way asks for a 'meaning' of inner-
worldly occurrences."60 The conceptualization of the world as "mean-
ingful" is in conflict with the conceptualization of the world as a value-
less "mechanism."
While accepting the problems created by disenchantment, Weber
did not suggest a return to the religious mysticism of the past. Yet the
problem is clear. Rationalism reduces the role played by substantive
values. Substantive values are the essence of the individual. Therefore,
the disenchantment of the world seems to be moving humankind to-
ward cultural anomie and alienation. For this reason Weber claimed
that "culture's every step forward seems condemned to lead to an ever
more devastating senselessness."61
B. Charisma and Historic Change
At the end of the Protestant Ethic Weber indicated three possible paths
for the future in discussing the emergence of the "iron cage." "No one
knows who will live in this cage in the future, or whether at the end of
this tremendous development entirely new prophets will arise, or if
there will be a great rebirth of old ideas and ideals, or, if neither,
mechanized petrification, embellished with a sort of convulsive self-im-
portance."62 The "rebirth of old ideas and ideals" could only mean
one thing in the modern context, the reassertion of past religious doc-
trines. But, as Weber already suggested, the religious doctrine of prior
periods retreated because they were in conflict with the scientific, con-
ceptual understanding of the world. Therefore, their re-emergence
without the corresponding disintegration of the scientific world view is
unlikely.
59 Weber, From Max Weber, 350-51
60 Ibid., 351.
61 Ibid., 357.
62 Weber, Protestant Ethic, 182.
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Weber did not favour a return to the ecclesiastical domination and
mysticism of the Middle Ages. The mechanized petrification of for-
mally rationalized, institutional culture was equally abhorrent to him.
The third possibility mentioned by Weber, new "prophecy," defined as
a conceptual reorientation of humankind to the environment, became
his only alternative. It is new "prophecy" that in the past has "swept
through communities," welding them together.63
Nevertheless, there is a problem. Prophecy is not the sole compo-
nent in the process of social change. Prophecy is one element in the
process which transforms society. The "revelation" of the creative in-
dividual is transformed into historic change through the emotional
bond the prophetic individual forms with those who adhere to the new
"prophecy." To this process which links the creative, intuitive revela-
tion of individuals to the emotional longing of followers for change,
Weber applied the term "charisma."
Charisma has a central role in Weber's conception of social
change. Charisma is a "special gift of body and mind" that is per-
ceived in an individual by others.64 Charismatic figures tend to rise in a
time of great social, economic, religious, or political distress. The fol-
lowers seek a means to adjust themselves to the new conditions. The
charismatic leader provides that means by breaking the old norms, val-
ues and orientation to the environment. "In this purely empirical and
value-free sense charisma is indeed the specifically creative revolution-
ary force of history."65
Charisma is the creative force in history because the origins of its
revolutionary character stem from an act of creative human intuition
that is free from the confines of environmental necessity.66 The formal
and instrumental character of modern mass society also generates a
revolutionary impact on the individual, but this force is of an entirely
different character from that of charisma.
Bureaucratic rationalization . . . has been a major revolutionary force.... But
it revolutionizes with "technical means," in principle, as does every economic
reorganization, "from without": It first changes the material and social orders,
and through them the people, by changing the conditions of adaptation....
Charismatic belief revolutionizes men "from within" and shapes material and
social conditions according to its revolutionary will.67
Individuals may adjust themselves to the institutional structure but
this does not constitute revolutionary "will"; it may merely be the in-
63 Weber, From Max Weber, 155.
64 Weber, Economy and Society, 1112.
65 Ibid., 1117.
66 Mommsen, "Max Weber's Political Sociology," 29.
67 Weber, Economy and Society, 1116.
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strumental calculation of the best means of survival within an already
existing social order. Charismatic transformation contains the substan-
tive elements lacking in a purely instrumental adjustment to formal cir-
cumstance. However, every step forward for formal and instrumental
culture diminishes the role played by charisma in social life.68
"It is the fate of charisma . . . to recede with the development of
permanent institutional structures."69 This is the case because of the
process of adjustment that must occur in rational culture. Adjusting to
the exigencies of the external instrumental and formal culture requires
discipline. Discipline prepares people to carry out orders. To the extent
that it contains a substantive component, discipline instils the value of
"duty and obligation" as one conforms to the rules of the mass organi-
zation that rational discipline makes possible.70 Rational discipline is
the most "irresistible force" opposed to charisma.
Weber suggested that all discipline was born of military discipline.
However, modern society was characterized by two great agencies of
discipline, the large-scale economic enterprise and bureaucracy. "[The]
organizational discipline in the factory has a completely rational basis.
With the help of suitable methods of measurement, the optimum profit-
ability of the individual worker is calculated."71 The implications for
the individual are clearly stated. "The psycho-physical apparatus of
man is completely adjusted to the demands of the outer world, the
tools, the machine —in short, it is functionalized, and the individual is
shorn of his natural rhythm as determined by his organism; in line with
the demands of the work procedure... ."72 In this process the worker is
turned into a "cog" in the service of the instrumental logic of corpo-
rate capitalism. Therefore, the modern form of economic enterprise is
in a state of conflict with the process that could transform society: char-
ismatic inspiration.
However, Weber found the greatest tension between modern cul-
ture and the individual in the formalism existing in "all" large-scale
bureaucracies, economic and political. Individuality is negated as for-
mal rules and procedures replace personal contact. This condition has
the most profound impact on those who form the components of the
state "machine." "The individual bureaucrat cannot squirm out of the
apparatus in which he is harnessed.... [H]e is only a single cog in an
ever moving mechanism which prescribes to him an essentially fixed
68 Ibid., 1148.
69 Ibid., 1133.
70 Ibid., 1149.
71 Ibid., 1155,1156.
72 Ibid., 1156.
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route of march."73 In this system each of the little "cogs" seeks to be-
come a bigger cog in the social mechanism.74
Here the contrast between what Weber termed the "cultured
man" and the "spiritless specialist" becomes evident. As people ad-
just themselves to the requirements of an external structure of domina-
tion they become psychologically dependent on it.
The passion for bureaucracy . . . is enough to drive one to despair. It is as if in
politics the specter of timidity... were to stand alone at the helm: as if we
were deliberately to become men who need "order" and nothing but order,
who become nervous and cowardly if for one moment their order wavers, and
helpless if they are torn away from their total incorporation in it.75
As individuals adjust themselves to the requirements of external, for-
mal, structures, and become dependent on those structures for their new
identity, there is only one political outcome that is possible. The adher-
ence to an internal set of norms and substantive values is replaced by
the substantive requirements of the external culture. "Order," "con-
trol," "duty" and "discipline" replace the more "sublime values"
that are now in retreat before the march of rationalism in modern cul-
ture.
The formalism found in the economy reinforces the formalism
found in the state bureaucracy. Weber concluded: "The whole process
of rationalization, in the factory as elsewhere, and especially in the bu-
reaucratic state machine, parallels the centralization of the material im-
plements of organization in the hands of the master."76 Modern ration-
al culture erodes the possibility for freedom as it destroys the possibil-
ity for truly individual conduct.77
The authoritarianism that characterizes bureaucratic formalism re-
duces the role played by charisma in modern culture. The march of this
"human machine" destroys all structures of domination which are not
formally structured.78 But charisma is the creative, revolutionary force
in history. The waning of charisma in modern rational culture also indi-
cates a diminished capacity for the society creatively to adapt and
transform itself. Therefore, Weber ultimately responded with a pessi-
mistic answer to the question he posed in The Protestant Ethic. Who
will live in this "cage" of the future if the creative individual has be-
come subordinate to the requirements of rational culture? The answer is
"everyone."
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5. Conclusion: Weber's Place within "Modernity"
Weber's work reflects a tension characteristic of modern Enlightenment
epistemology. Since the beginning of the Enlightenment "reason" has
been represented as the dichotomous contrast to human emotion.
Within this paradigm, reason is treated as the source for objective
knowledge. Science is the human activity that applies reason to sense
impression in order to discover the regularly recurring patterns of cau-
sality in the world. Science unmasks the objective character of the
world. Emotion, passion and even sense impressions distort the ability
of objective reason to uncover the universal principles that govern the
activity of the world.
This view of science and knowledge led Weber to conclude that
science was moving humanity toward an ever increasing senselessness.
Reason has the ability to create the social environment that give struc-
ture and control in human life. To Weber this was represented in the
types of rationality used to orient human life, particularly instrumental
and formal rationality. However, within the Enlightenment paradigm
an augmentation had occurred to the subject-object dichotomy. Reason
had come to represent "subject."
Within the Kantian epistemology, the externalization of reason in
the form of institutional laws, structures and practices represents the
subjedification of the objective form. Human beings are reduced to
"objects" for control and manipulation by "externalized reason." To
Weber, this meant that "complete" human nature, that is both reason
and emotion, was subordinate to the objectification process in modern
rational culture. By not challenging the paradigm of "modernism" it-
self, Weber was forced to conclude that the march of "science" and
bureaucracy were inevitable and that "modernity" itself represented a
valueless, nihilistic void.
Ultimately, Weber took the Enlightenment epistemology to its log-
ical conclusion. Science produces "objective" knowledge. Weber be-
lieved that because "social science" could not escape the influence of
human values, substantive commitments and cultural influences, the
"social sciences" were qualitatively different from the natural
sciences. "Social science" can only produce "interpretive understand-
ing." By making this distinction Weber relegated the discourse about
human beings to secondary status. "Social science" cannot escape hu-
man values and values cannot be proven scientifically. As subject,
however, human beings have a problem in this modern scientific cul-
ture. Science cannot tell us how to live.79 According to Weber, we are
trapped between the epistemological demands of enlightenment ration-
alism and the ontological pressure for a complete human existence.
79 Ibid., 143.
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It should be clear that Weber's pessimism about modernity was
determined by the assumptions he made regarding science, knowledge
and the "essence" of the human personality. Unlike Nietzsche, Weber
was not willing to scrap the Enlightenment view of knowledge. Nie-
tzsche rejected the dichotomous opposition between subject and object.
Nietzsche rejected the universalism that served as the foundation for
the Enlightenment view of knowledge. Nietzsche relegated the entire
Enlightenment project to an exercise in metaphysical speculation.
Had Weber given up the idea of science discovering "universal
principles," and had he held the view that science is also an "interpre-
tive" enterprise, he might have reached a different conclusion about
the fate of humanity. Weber saw his analysis reflecting a universal de-
scription of the results of modern, rational, scientific culture. Weber
held onto the modern definitions of "science" and "logic" and took
them to their limits in his attempt to explain the conditions of human
existence in the modern industrial age. There is no escape from the pes-
simism that has come to characterize Weber's work given his beliefs
about science and human nature. Every step forward is a step deeper
into the abyss.
